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DOUBLE JEOPARDY: CAN NON-MONETARY CIVIL 
SANCTIONS CONSTITUTE PUNISHMENT UNDER THE 
FIFTH AMENDMENT? 
Robyn Schein a Brown 
Introduction 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides that no person shall "be subj ect for the 
same offense to be twice put injeopardy oflife or limb 
.... "1 Historically, this protection has been interpreted 
to include three possible scenarios: (1) a second prose-
cution for the identical offense after an acquittal; (2) a 
second prosecution for the identical offense after a 
conviction; or (3) multiple punishments for the same 
offense.2 Although challenges based on the Fifth Amend-
ment have traditionally dealt with multiple criminal 
punishments, the more recent focus on the Double 
Jeopardy Clause has not been on criminal sanctions, but 
instead on various civil sanctions and whether they 
constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. 
The Supreme Court has thus been forced to attempt to 
define what constitutes punishment within the context of 
the prohibitions against double jeopardy. 
The Supreme Court Lays the Foundation 
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided the case of 
United States v. Halper3 and for the first time held that 
a civil sanction imposed by the government could con-
stitute punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy. 4 
In Halper, the defendant was convicted of violating a 
federal statuteS which prohibits making false claims 
against the United States Government.6 Subsequent to 
Halper's conviction,7 the government brought civil charg-
es against him under the Civil False Claims Act, based on 
the same conduct for which he was convicted.8 Halper 
then took a direct appeal to the Supreme Court9 on the 
issue of whether he was twice put injeopardy when the 
government proceeded with the subsequent civil law-
suit. 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the 
mere fact that the lawsuit was civil in nature did not 
mean that double jeopardy could not be implicated. lo 
The Court further explained that: 
the determination whether a given civil 
sanction constitutes punishment in the 
relevant sense requires a particularized 
assessment of the penalty imposed and 
the purpose that the penalty may fairly 
be said to serve. Simply put, a civil as 
well as criminal sanction constitutes 
punishment when the sanction as ap-
plied in the individual case serves the 
goal of punishment. II 
On the one hand, therefore, a civil sanction 
which serves only to compensate the government for its 
losses would not implicate the prohibitions of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. On the other hand, a civil 
sanction which was intended as a deterrent or to seek 
retribution would constitute "punishment" for double 
jeopardy purposes.12 Based on this reasoning, the 
Court concluded that where the subsequent civil sanc-
tion "bears no rational relation to the goal of compen-
sating the [g]overnment for its loss, but rather appears 
to qualify as 'punishment' in the plain meaning of the 
word,"13 the defendant may validly assert a challenge 
to those sanctions based on double jeopardy grounds. 14 
The Court cautioned, however, that its interpretation 
was only to apply in "rare case[s]," such as the one the 
Court was confronted with in Halper. IS 
Four years later, the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in Austin v. United States 16 and held 
that civil forfeiture could constitute '''payment to a 
sovereign as punishment for some offense."'17 In 
Austin, the petitioner plead guilty to committing vari-
ous drug offenses. 18 The government subsequently 
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sought to have Austin's mobile home and auto body 
shop forfeited since evidence existed that these instru-
mentalities were "used or intended to be used" to 
facilitate Austin's drug operation. 19 Austin opposed the 
forfeiture claiming that it violated the Excessive Fines 
Clause of the Eight Amendment.20 After an extensive 
review of forfeiture at common law,21 the Supreme 
Court rejected the United States' claims that forfeiture 
was remedial only since the forfeiture: (1) served to 
protect the community because it removed instruments 
of the drug trade from the streets;22 and (2) compensat-
ed "the Government for the expense of law enforce-
ment activity and for its expenditure on societal prob-
lems such as urban blight, drug addiction, and other 
health concerns resulting from the drug trade."23 Re-
gardless of these arguments, the Court found that since 
the civil forfeiture in Austin's case could "only be 
explained as serving in part to punish,"24 it could be 
subjected to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.25 Austin, therefore, suggests that the 
sanction must only be "in part" to punish in order to 
violate the defendant's constitutional rights. InHalper, 
however, the Court alluded to the fact that the sanction 
had to be solely for the purpose of punishment before it 
would be subjected to a double jeopardy analysis.26 
Thus, the controversy arises. 
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth 
Ranch27 was decided one year after Austin. In Kurth 
Ranch, the Court further prodded the issue of what 
exactly constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy 
purposes. By a 7-2 majority, the Court held that the 
imposition of a tax on the possession of dangerous 
drugs, after the defendants were convicted of various 
possession-related crimes, violated their Fifth Amend-
ment rights.28 Distinguishing Kurth Ranch from 
Halper,29 the Court undertook its own analysis of 
whether a tax specifically violated the prohibitions 
against double jeopardy. In Kurth Ranch, the Court 
found that although "taxes are typically motivated by 
revenue-raising rather than punitive purposes,"30 the 
prohibitions against double jeopardy were violated, 
since: (1) a large part of the tax imposed equated to 
more than eight times the market value of the contra-
band;31 (2) the tax was conditioned upon the commis-
sion of a crime;32 and (3) although the tax was charac-
terized as a "property tax," it was imposed only after 
the illegal narcotics had been forfeited to the state. 33 The 
Court concluded by stating that "[t]his drug tax is not 
the kind of remedial sanction that may follow the first 
punishment of a criminal offense," because it rose to the 
level of punishment for double jeopardy purposes.34 
The decisions in Halper, Austin, and Kurth 
Ranch unsurprisingly opened the door to an entire arena 
oflitigation of whether various ci viI sanctions constitut-
ed punishment for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. No longer was double jeopardy limited to 
criminal actions. Since these three Supreme Court 
decisions, lower courts have been forced to grapple 
with the issues of when the decisions in Halper, Austin 
and Kurth Ranch are binding upon specific cases of civil 
sanctions, and where exactly to draw the line between 
sanctions that are remedial only, and those that are 
punitive in nature. Furthermore, lower courts have 
found themselves forced to address situations left unan-
swered by Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch, including 
other civil penalties which could possibly constitute 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. These civil 
penalties have included the revocation or suspension of 
a driver' s license or a professional license, prison disci-
plinary proceedings, exclusion from participating in 
government programs, or the forfeiture of property to 
the State. Each of these issues will be discussed in more 
detail, as well as the effect of the Supreme Court's 
definitions of "punishment" on lower courts. 
Driver's and Professional License Suspensions 
and Revocations 
Since Halper was decided in 1989, an over-
whelming number of jurisdictions have been forced to 
determine whether, in light of the principles enunciated 
in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch, suspensions and 
revocations of driver's licenses and other professional 
licenses implicate the prohibitions of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. For a variety of reasons, virtually every 
jurisdiction that has been confronted with such a task 
has held that the suspension of these licenses does not 
violate the protections afforded by the Fifth Amend-
ment.35 
With regard to the suspension of an individual's 
driver's license, courts have uniformly held that, al-
though the principles set forth in the three Supreme 
Court cases are instructive, their specific situations 
were distinguishable from the loss ofa driver' s license.36 
Therefore, although Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch 
were not factually binding upon these lower courts, the 
Supreme Court's respective analyses were nontheless 
employed. Based on the Supreme Court's guidance, 
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lower courts have held that license suspension or revo-
cation proceedings do not implicate the double jeopardy 
prohibitions for three main reasons.37 
First, many courts have never reached the issue 
of whether licensing sanctions constitute punishment for 
double jeopardy purposes, because these courts have 
held that a license revocation or suspension proceeding 
is administrative in nature and, therefore, the protections 
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause are inapplica-
ble.38 As stated by the Court of Appeals of Kansas, 
"[t]he decision to suspend [the defendant's] driving 
privilege is an administrative action and not a criminal 
proceeding ... [and] the imposition of administrative 
sanctions and criminal prosecutions are not prohibited 
under the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause."39 Further-
more, because a proceeding to determine if an individ-
ual's license should be suspended or revoked "is entirely 
separate and distinct from the proceedings to determine 
the guilt or innocence of the person," the protections 
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause are not impli-
cated.4o 
Second, the revocation or suspension of a driv-
er's license does not constitute punishment but, instead, 
serves other legitimate remedial purposes. These pur-
. poses include: (1) the promotion of public safety by 
removing drunk drivers from state highways;41 (2) pro-
viding a mechanism by which authorities can gather 
evidence of the commission of a crime;42 and (3) the 
rehabilitation of those drivers who are intoxicated.43 
Furthermore, the mere fact that the suspension or revo-
cation of a driver's license may "carry the sting of 
punishment" is not dispositive, because the primary 
purpose of the sanction is remedial and, thus, double 
jeopardy is not implicated.44 As stated by the Supreme 
. Court of New Mexico in State v. Kennedy, "[i]t is 
obvious that deterrence of misconduct will be one 
practical effect of any regulatory scheme that allows the 
government to revoke a license that authorizes a person 
to drive motor vehicles or pursue a livelihood. But this 
deterrent purpose does not mean that administrative 
revocation of these licenses is 'punishment' for purposes 
of the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause."45 Therefore, 
because "the motorist suffers no loss of liberty, no 
incarceration or fine as the result of the suspension or 
revocation of his license but merely forfeits the privilege 
of driving on public highways,"46 the sanction is not 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
Third, many states have recognized that holding 
a driver's license is a privilege and not a right. Hence, 
it is within an individual state's police powers to 
regulate the holding of a license.47 In State v. Savard, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine explained this 
rationale. 
When issued a license, the vehicle op-
erator agrees to abide by certain condi-
tions and rules of the road . . . and 
acknowledges that the continued use of 
the license to drive is dependent on 
compliance with the laws relating to 
vehicle operation. A licensee has no 
absolute right of ownership in a motor 
vehicle operator's license. A licensee's 
right to use the license is specifically 
conditioned on observing specified 
operating standards. The suspension 
of that privilege merely signifies the 
failure of the holder to comply with 
agreed conditions.48 
Therefore, because the government is fully entitled to 
regulate the behavior at issue, it is not punishment to 
take away an individual's license for any period oftime. 
Rather, the government is simply withholding a priv.i-
lege which the driver forfeited by his own actions.49 
Based on the foregoing reasons, jurisdictions 
have consistently held that the suspension of a driver's 
license is not one of the "rare cases" described in 
Halper in which acivil sanction constitutes punishment 
for double jeopardy purposes. 50 Instead, the suspen-
sion or revocation of a driver's license "is the all too 
common case in which a driver who has repeatedly 
endangered the lives and well-being of others by driv-
ing while intoxicated is merel y depri ved of the pri vilege 
to drive for a [specified] period."51 
Courts dealing with professional licensing 
schemes have also found the prohibitions of double 
jeopardy inapplicable. For instance, courts have up-
held the restrictions, suspensions, or revocations of 
various types of professional licenses, including a 
license to practice medicine,52 a license to practice 
law,53 a license to operate a funeral home,54 a liquor 
license,55 a business license,56 a license to sell insur-
ance,57 and a license to sell real estate.58 The rationale 
for allowing such sanctions is virtually identical to that 
of the suspension or revocation of a driver's license. 
Namely, the sanction is not punitive in nature, but 
rather serves to protect the public from individuals not 
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competent to adequately perform their occupations. 59 
Furthermore, since the proceedings are administrative 
rather than criminal in nature, double jeopardy has no 
bearing upon the sanctions imposed.60 Therefore, it 
could be argued that any type oflicensing scheme would 
not be subject to the claim that a revocation or suspen-
sion of that license constitutes punishment for double 
jeopardy purposes. 
Prison Disciplinary Proceedings 
Another area ofthe double jeopardy controversy 
which has continually surfaced despite the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch is 
that of prison disciplinary proceedings. Various juris-
dictions throughout the nation have consistently held 
that prison disciplinary proceedings do not implicate the 
prohibitions outlined in the Double Jeopardy Clause of 
theFifthAmendment.61 Many courts have further found 
Halper inapplicable to these proceedings because Halper 
involved a criminal prosecution followed by a civil suit 
for the same behavior.62 Kurth Ranch was similarly 
limited to only those situations where a tax was imposed 
as the penalty at issue.63 Austin has not even been 
discussed within the context of prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Hence, since the three Supreme Court cases 
dealt with manifestly different issues than that of a prison 
disciplinary sanction, they were not binding upon these 
lower courts. Therefore, any argument that disciplinary 
actions by prison officials followed by a subsequent 
criminal prosecution implicates the prohibitions against 
double jeopardy will be futile. 
The disciplinary sanctions often imposed upon 
inmates who have violated prison rules commonly in-
clude: (1) solitary confinement or other types of seg-
regation from the rest of the prison population,64 (2) loss 
of good time credit,65 (3) loss of privileges, (4) a 
disciplinary transfer, or (5) a reduction in the prisoner's 
status.66 Regardless of which sanction is imposed, 
however; courts have found the proscriptions of double 
jeopardy inapposite for several reasons. 
First, a prison disciplinary proceeding is not the 
equivalent of a "criminal prosecution" or trial which 
-would implicate the proscriptions against double jeopar-
cly.67 Therefore, since a disciplinary hearing is not a 
judicial proceeding with the purpose of determining the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant beyond a reasonable 
doubt, double jeopardy does not come into play.68 
Second, the purpose of a prison disciplinary 
sanction is not punitive in nature. Rather, it is to 
maintain order and promote security within the entire 
prison system.69 As stated by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit: 
[p ]unitive interests and remedial inter-
ests ... are nowhere so tightly inter-
twined as in the prison setting, where 
the government's remedial interest is to 
maintain order and to prevent violent 
altercations among a population of crim-
inals. Accordingly, the mere fact that a 
sanction imposed by prison officials has 
a punitive component does not mean 
that the sanction constitutes "punish-
ment" for double jeopardy purposes.70 
Therefore, the promotion of internal security within the 
prison system, while conveying to other inmates that 
such behavior will not be tolerated, is not equated to 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
Third, courts have found that these disciplinary 
sanctions serve to rehabilitate the prisoner rather than 
punish him. As stated by the Colorado Court of 
Appeals, "[b ]reaches of prison regulations reflect an 
inmate's disregard for rules of social and prison life and 
threaten prison security. Remediation of such infrac-
tions, therefore, is essential both to promote inmate 
rehabilitation and to maintain order."71 
When confronted with a double jeopardy chal-
lenge in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, 
courts have held that broad discretion should be allot-
ted to prison officials and their judgments as to the 
appropriate sanction to be imposed in any given case. 72 
In United States v. Newby, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that this discre-
tion was given to prison officials in large part because: 
the adoption and execution of policies 
and practices necessary to preserve 
internal order and discipline, and to 
maintain institutional security in the 
prison are "peculiarly within the prov-
ince and professional expertise of cor-
rections officers, and, in the absence of 
substantial evidence in the record to 
indicate that the officials have exagger-
ated their response[,] courts should 
ordinarily defer to their expert judg-
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ment in such matters."73 
Courts have noted that these same prison offi-
cials should not be faced with the various problems that 
could arise if the Double Jeopardy Clause were found 
applicable to these disciplinary proceedings. For exam-
ple, if discipline by prison authorities barred a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, prison officials would then 
be forced to choose between implementing the sanc-
tions within the prison system and forfeiting the possi-
bility of any criminal prosecution, or the reverse.74 
Furthermore, since bringing an inmate to trial could 
take a considerable amount oftime, the "difficulties and 
delay that a criminal prosecution entails would leave the 
prisoners who violated the prison rules without a prompt 
resolution of charges and hinder prison administration 
and discipline."75 Finally, one court recognized that it 
would be absurd on the one hand to allow "those 
violations of prison regulations that do not rise to the 
level of criminal behavior [to] come within prison 
officials' duty to maintain prison discipline, while more 
heinous behavior is beyond their reach except at the cost 
of precluding subsequent criminal prosecution. "76 
Therefore, as long as the prison officials are acting 
within their prescribed limits, the sanctions they choose 
to impose will not be successfully challenged on double 
jeopardy grounds. 
Exclusion from Participation in Government Pro-
grams 
The double jeopardy controversy has also had 
little impact on the exclusion of individuals from partic-
ipation in government programs. As with the other civil 
sanctions discussed, courts have held that the exclusion 
from government programs is remedial only, and there-
fore not punishment for double jeopardy purposes. For 
example, courts have upheld the exclusion of doctors 
from Medicare programs when it was shown that the 
doctors made fraudulent claims to these Medicare 
agencies. 77 Other areas of governmental exclusion have 
also been upheld, such as participation in the commod-
ities trading market,18 HUD housing programs,19 and 
the Federal Drug Administration Program. 80 The ratio-
nale for these exclusions was very similar to that of the 
revocation or suspension of an individual's driver's 
license or professionallicense--protection of the public 
and of the industry. As explained by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: 
the decision to exclude [the defendant] 
from any contract market can be seen as 
an action to ensure the integrity of the 
markets and protect them from people 
like [the defendant]. Commodities and 
instruments representing billions of dol-
lars are traded on the nation's contract 
markets every year. Maintaining a fair 
and unadultered open market is a pro-
found and necessary pursuit for our 
economic well-being. Iffraudulent prac-
tices undermining the integrity of the 
markets were to proceed unchecked, 
the vital efficiency of the market mech-
anism would bejeopardized.81 
Courts dealing with similar governmental prohibitions 
have reached the same conclusion, holding that, al-
though the individuals may consider the sanctions to be 
punishment, "rough remedial justice" cannot be equat-
ed to punishment for double jeopardy purposes.82 Fur-
thermore, the severity or duration of the exclusion is of 
no import and will not serve to make an otherwise 
permissible sanction punishment within the prohibitions 
of double jeopardy.83 
Finally, one court outlined a number of factors 
which should be considered when determining whether 
a civil sanction is remedial or punitive in nature. These 
factors include: 
[w]hetherthe sanction involves an affir-
mative disability of restraint, whether it 
has historically been regarded as a pun-
ishment, whether it comes into play only 
on a finding of scienter, whether its 
operation will promote the traditional 
aims of punishment -- retribution and 
deterrence, whether the behavior to 
which it applies is already a crime, wheth-
er an alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for 
it, and whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose as-
signed .... 84 
Therefore, taking all things into consideration, courts 
have uniformly held that the exclusion from government 
programs is not one of those "rare cases" enunciated in 
Halper which mandates the application of the Double 
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Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.85 
Other Civil Sanctions Deemed Remedial 
Lower courts have also found other civil sanc-
tions remedial only and, therefore, not in violation ofthe 
Double Jeopardy Clause. Although these areas have not 
received as much attention as the suspension or revoca-
tion of a driver' s or professional license, prison disciplin-
ary proceedings, or the exclusion from participation in 
government programs, they nevertheless deserve to be 
mentioned as evidence of how lower courts have inter-
preted "punishment" within the context of the double 
jeopardy prohibitions. 
For example, the expulsion of a child from 
school followed by juvenile proceedings arising out of 
the same conduct was held not to violate the principles 
of double jeopardy. 86 Courts addressing this issue have 
generally found that the expulsion did not rise to the level 
of punishment for double jeopardy purposes since: (1) 
the expulsion from school did not equate to a criminal 
prosecution which would subject the child to the double 
jeopardy analysis; and (2) the purpose ofthe expulsion 
was to protect the other students rather than to penalize 
the individual who committed the offense. As explained 
by the Court of Appeals of Arizona: 
school officials, as a body and individu-
ally, have a responsibility for maintaining 
order upon the school premises so that 
the education, teaching and training of 
the students may be accomplished in an 
atmosphere oflaw and order. In measur-
ing the reasonableness of an expulsion, 
courts must give credence to the role and 
purpose of the schools and the means 
available to school administrators to deal 
with their problemsY 
Furthermore, the termination of parental rights 
followed by a criminal prosecution for child abuse or 
neglect has been held not to implicate prohibitions 
against double jeopardy.88 The rationale for such a 
finding is that a proceeding to terminate parental rights 
is not a criminal prosecution designed to determine 
innocence or guilt and, therefore, double jeopardy does 
not come into play.89 Furthermore, the purpose of the 
termination of parental rights is to "provide children 
with permanent and stable family relationships,"90 (i.e., 
do what is in the best interests of the child) and not to 
punish the parent offender.91 
Holding an individual in contempt of court and 
ordering imprisonment unless that individual affirma-
tively decides to purge the contempt does not implicate 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 92 
Courts have held that because a contempt proceeding 
is civil in nature,93 and, more importantly, because the 
contemnor "[holds] the keys in his own pocket"94 since 
he alone is capable of purging the contempt charge, the 
double jeopardy prohibitions are not violated when a 
criminal suit is also brought in conjunction with the 
contempt charge. 
Finally, courts have held that other civil sanc-
tions designed to serve remedial purposes only do not 
implicate the prohibitions of double jeopardy. Such 
sanctions include: (1) the reduction of an individual's 
pension;95 (2) the withholding of vacation benefits from 
employees found to have engaged in criminal con-
duct;96 (3) a dishonorable discharge from the military;97 
(4) the civil commitment ofanindividual;98 and (5) the 
awarding of punitive damages in a civil suit between 
private parties. 99 Therefore, although courts have been 
careful not to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause where 
the sanction is remedial only, a flurry oflitigation has 
nevertheless erupted in all areas of civil law which 
impose any penalties upon the wrongdoer. 
Forfeiture of Property by a Sovereign 
Whether the forfeiture of illegal proceeds by a 
sovereign constitutes double jeopardy has caused great 
dissention among and within the various jurisdictions 
which have addressed the issue. One would conjecture 
that the Supreme Court's decisions in Halper, Austin, 
and Kurth Ranch made the issue a simple one for lower 
courts. Such was not the case. The Supreme Court's 
"guidance" as to what should constitute punishment 
for double jeopardy purposes has only further muddied 
the waters for courts deciding if forfeiture bars a 
criminal prosecution. In fact, lower courts have dis-
agreed on virtually every aspect of the double jeopardy 
analysis, inc1udingwhether a civil forfeiture of property 
along with a criminal prosecution constitutes the "same 
offense" for double jeopardy purposes, whether such 
actions are part of the same proceeding for double 
jeopardy purposes, whether a civil forfeiture consti-
tutes "punishment," and whether the three Supreme 
Court cases are even applicable to a forfeiture proceed-
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ing. loo Therefore, as one might expect, various cases 
addressing the issue of whether civil forfeiture consti-
tutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes have 
reached conflicting conclusions. 
The majority of lower courts addressing the 
issue have found that the principles of double jeopardy 
are not implicated when a sovereign brings an action to 
forfeit an individual's property. These courts have 
based their findings on a number of criteria. First, the 
main reason for finding double jeopardy inapposite to a 
civil forfeiture is that the forfeiture is remedial in nature 
and not punitive. 101 In making such a determination, 
these courts have pointed to a number of factors as 
evidence that the specific statutory forfeiture provisions 
are remedial onl y. Some considerations include the fact 
that various statutes provide for a limited use of the 
property once forfeited to the state,102 the owner of 
illegal proceeds has no property interest in the objects 
forfeited to the state,103 and that a forfeiture proceeding 
carries with it a lesser burden of proof than a criminal 
prosecution. 104 
Second, courts examining the purpose of these 
forfeiture statutes have found that since they do not 
serve to punish, the prohibitions against double jeopar-
dy are not implicated. Several purposes of forfeiture 
provisions have been enunciated by lower courts. The 
most common of these purposes is the situation where 
forfeiting an individual's property used in illegal activ-
ities provides compensation to the government for the 
cost of prosecution of such cases. 105 Other purposes 
espoused by various lower courts include the forfeiture 
of property in order to "abate past offending uses of 
property and prevent future offending uses of the 
property,"106 and in cases where the amount forfeited is 
relatively small, "to save the government the time and 
expense of[ a ] judicial [forfeiture] proceeding. "107 Courts 
which have found the principles of double jeopardy 
inapplicable to an in rem civil forfeiture action have 
focused primarily on the compensation of the govern-
ment as a legitimate purpose of the forfeiture provision 
at issue. 
A third reason why some courts have dismissed 
the notion that a civil forfeiture proceeding implicates 
the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause 
is that, when dealing with a statute permitting the 
forfeiture of property intended to be used in illicit 
activity, the intention of use is a separate and distinct 
offense from the possession of illicit materials or contra-
band. los Therefore, double jeopardy is not violated 
because the defendant is not twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Finally, in various cases, courts have avoided 
the issue of whether civil forfeiture constitutes punish-
ment altogether. Instead, these courts have found that 
since the defendants did not contest the civil forfeiture, 
they were not placed in jeopardy a first time, so as to 
preclude a second jeopardy by a criminal prosecution. 109 
As explained by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit in United States v. Clark, "the forfeiture was not 
contested, and we have recently held that a 'summary 
forfeiture, by definition, can never serve as ajeopardy 
component of a double jeopardy motion. "'110 
Courts upholding the various forfeiture pro-
ceedings as constitutional have distinguished the forfei-
tures at issue from the facts of Halper. III Nevertheless, 
these same courts have employed the Halper rationale 
and have concluded that the various forfeitures were 
rationally related to the offenses committed and were 
not so disproportionate in nature as to rise to the level 
of punishment for double jeopardy purposes. I 12 
Although the majority of courts confronted 
with the issue have held that civil forfeiture does not 
implicate the prohibitions of double jeopardy, a grow-
ing minority have found that civil forfeiture may, in fact, 
prevent a criminal prosecution. The courts have relied 
heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Austin, 
regardless ofthe factthatAustin only dealt directly with 
the issue of punishment in the context of the Eighth 
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause. I 13 As explained by 
the Court of Appeals of Louisiana in State v. 1979 
Cadillac Deville, "[a]lthoughnot specifically deciding 
adoublejeopardyclaiminAustin, the Court's reasoning 
makes it clear that double jeopardy applies in [a civil 
forfeiture case] because forfeiture of derivative contra-
band is not solely remedial, and therefore it constitutes 
punishment." I 14 
Using the rationale of A ustin, some jurisdictions 
have found that civil forfeiture proceedings implicate 
the prohibitions of double jeopardy because these pro-
cedures do, in fact, constitute punishment for double 
jeopardy purposes. For example, many courts have 
pointed out the fact that various statutes provided for an 
"innocent owner defense," whereby an individual may 
be exempt from the forfeiture of his property ifhe can 
show that he did not know that his property was being 
used for illicit purposes, leads to the conclusion that 
those statutes aim to punish the offenders who do not 
fall into the category of "innocent owners."IIS 
Furthermore, these courts have also found that 
the forfeiture of property does constitute the "same 
offense" as the criminal prosecution.1I6 Using the 
"same elements test" derived from Blockberger v. 
United States,J17 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit explained that: 
the forfeiture and conviction are punish-
ment for the same offense because the 
forfeiture necessarily requires proof of 
the criminal offense .... Even though 
the standard of proof is more easily met 
in the civil action, the fact remains that 
the government cannot confiscate [the 
defendant's] residence without a show-
ing that he was manufacturing marijua-
na. lls 
Therefore, when proof of the underlying felony is 
necessary for the forfeiture of the individual's property, 
courts have generally held that the subsequent forfei-
ture proceeding is barred by double jeopardy principles. 
Some courts have held that a forfeiture that 
partially serves remedial purposes is not dispositive for 
double jeopardy purposes. Following the Supreme 
Court's guidance, one lower court found that "[i]n the 
wake of Austin and Kurth Ranch, we believe that a 
forfeiture under the [specific forfeiture statute] consti-
tutes punishment even though it may serve sonie reme-
dial purposes. "119 Finally, courts also have opined that 
the fallacious belief that the forfeiture of property 
removes a dangerous item from society will no longer 
be a valid defense to the forfeiture of that property. 
Although such a rationale may be appropriate when the 
item to be seized is contraband, the rationale loses its 
credibility when the items to be seized are an individu-
ai's home or motor home. 120 
Although the various federal and state statutes 
permitting the forfeiture of property upon the coinmis-
sion of a crime may vary somewhat and therefore 
partially account for the differing holdings among lower 
courts, forfeiture will nevertheless continue to be a 
source of great debate among lower courts. Regardless 
of the statute at issue in any given case, lower courts 
have continually had difficulty in coming to terms with 
whether forfeiture constitutes punishment for the pur-
poses of the Double Jeopardy Clause and whether the 
three seminal Supreme Court cases in reality aid the 
lower courts in their quest. 
Conclusions 
Upon close examination of the evolution of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause over the past six years and how 
courts have defined punishment in the context of civil 
proceedings, it becomes apparent that what was origi-
nally espoused in Halper as the "rare case" has come 
full circle. As evidenced by the previous civil sanctions 
discussed, the scope of the decisions in Halper, Austin, 
and Kurth Ranch have arguably reached an entirely new 
level never contemplated by the Justices who handed 
down these three Supreme Court decisions. The "rare 
case" enunciated in Halper over six years ago has been 
transformed into the "common case" in an attempt to 
encompass virtually all areas of civil law which impose 
any type of sanction upon the wrongdoer. The warnings 
by the Court in Halper that "[ w ]hat we announce now 
is a rule for the nire case, the case such as the one before 
us, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific 
but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly 
disproportionate to the damages he has caused,"121 
have practically gone unnoticed. Until the Supreme 
Court affirmatively addresses the limitations of Halper 
to civil sanctions other than those discussed in Halper, 
lower courts will undoubtedly continue to grapple with 
the phenomena of what civil sanctions, if any, constitute 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
Furthermore, it is also a distinct possibility that 
although some of these lower courts may, in fact, have 
viewed the civil sanctions as additional punishments for 
double jeopardy purposes, they have nevertheless cho-
sen to hide behind the Supreme Court's rationales in 
Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch in an effort to reach 
an equitable result. For example, it would seem ridic-
ulous in a case where a doctor has been convicted of 
sexually assaulting his patients to bar the subsequent 
revocation or suspension of his license due to the 
prohibitions of twice being placed injeopardy for the 
same offense. In the same instance, it would seem 
equally ridiculous to prohibit the doctor's criminal 
prosecution due to the previous suspension or revoca-
tion of his license. The same analysis would follow for 
the suspension or revocation of a driver's license or 
prison disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the lower 
courts have quite possibly attempted to rationalize their 
findings by holding the principles of double jeopardy 
inapplicable. While the civil sanctions in reality may 
constitute a punishment for the offense committed, it is 
unlikely that courts will openly declare this fact and 
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allow society to suffer the consequences of prohibiting 
one form of punishment, whether it be the criminal 
prosection or the civil sanction. 
Finally, lower courts have struggled with the 
appropriate standard to apply in determining whether 
the civil sanction involved is remedial only or if it rises 
to the level ofpunishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
Halper, in 1989, announced that "a civil sanction that 
cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, 
but rather can only be explained as also serving either 
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we 
have come to understand the term."122 Austin, on the 
other hand, explained that the forfeiture of property 
could be subjected to the principles of double jeopardy 
if "it can only be explained as serving in part to 
punish."123 Based upon these two principles, the ques-
tion then becomes: must ute sanction be solely for 
punitive purposes before it will be barred by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, or must it only be in part to punish 
before the double jeopardy analysis will come into play? 
Put in other terms, does Austin seek to further explain 
what was originally enunciated in Halper, or does it 
create a new standard to apply? Once again, before 
further clarification is provided by the Supreme Court on 
the proper standard to apply, lower courts will continully 
be in conflict regarding which rule, if either, should be 
followed when faced with a double jeopardy challenge. 
In sum, beginning in 1989 with the decision in 
United States v. Halper, a multitude of litigation has 
reached federal and state courts regarding which civil 
sanctions, if any, necessitate the application of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Due 
to the newly espoused principles by the Supreme Court 
in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch, itis unlikely that the 
debate will end quickly or quietly, as courts try to define 
what constitutes punishment in the civil arena so that 
defendants may receive the full protections afforded by 
the Fifth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution: 
to be free from twice being put injeopardy for the same 
offense. 
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RODGERS TAVERN 1695 
(c) 1996, Caroline Jasper 
Susquehanna River traffic brought many visitors to the tavern, located at the site ofthe Lower Ferry in 
Perryville, Maryland, directly across the river from Havre de Grace. Most notably, George Washington 
was a frequent guest during the late 18th Century. This formidable stone structure is the birthplace of 
Commodore John Rodgers, founder of the United States Navy. 
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